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3From the commodity to  
the spectacle: Debord’s Marx
eric-JOhn russell 
 
Published a century after Marx’s Capital, Guy Debord’s The 
Society of the Spectacle was described upon its release as ‘the 
Capital of the new generation’ (Le Nouvel Observateur).1 However, 
the book’s content has almost never been seriously examined 
alongside the dialectical logic of the social forms of value 
systematically ordered within Marx’s Capital. Despite Debord’s 
description of the modern spectacle as a development of the 
commodity-capitalist economy, discussions on Debord’s debt to 
Marx customarily emphasize those early writings in which Marx 
enunciates the critique of alienation without having yet traversed 
the works of classical political economy.2
And for good reason, as his archival notes can verify. A 
preliminary glance at The Society of the Spectacle elicits the 
impression that the ‘ruthless criticism of all that exists’ first 
enunciated by Marx in his early twenties continued to reverber-
ate a century later.3 The book resounds with both implicit and 
1. The Society of the Spectacle was published in November 1967, a hundred years after 
the ﬁrst German edition of Capital, Volume 1, published in mid-September 1867.
2. Debord refers to classical political economy as ‘the science of domination’ (§41). 
Within the present work all selections from The Society of the Spectacle are taken from 
the English translation by Fredy Perlman and Jon Supak, ﬁrst published in Detroit by 
Black & Red, 1970. Quotations will be followed by thesis number to indicate location.
3. Debord began writing The Society of the Spectacle in the autumn of 1963 (Guy Debord 
Correspondance, Volume 2: Septembre 1960–Décembre 1964, Paris: Librairie Arthème 
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explicit reference to the phenomenon of social alienation or 
estrangement described by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts. And 
yet, we find, early on the following register of social alienation 
through which Debord situates the advent of the spectacle: 
The first phase of the domination of the economy over social life 
brought into the definition of all human realization the obvious 
degradation of being into having. The present phase of total 
occupation of social life by the accumulated results of the economy 
leads to a generalized sliding of having into appearing, from which 
all actual ‘having’ must draw its immediate prestige and its ultimate 
function. (§17)
Here, the primacy of appearance over property draws attention 
not simply to the way in which Debord’s theory of the spectacle 
acquires theoretical determinations from Marx’s early writings 
on social alienation, but, more specifically, how these develop-
ments of the commodity economy come to occupy a certain 
centrality to a dialectical structure of appearances in the critique 
of political economy. We find a clue in a 1990 letter to Giorgio 
Agamben where Debord writes:
I was happy to have attempted – in 1967 and completely contrary 
to Althusser’s sombre denial – a kind of ‘salvage by transfer’ of the 
Marxist method by adding to it a large dose of Hegel, at the same 
time as it reprised a critique of political economy that wanted to 
bear in mind the Marxist method’s ascertainable developments 
in our poor country, as they were foreseeable from what preceded 
them.4
Fayard, 2001. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-14 November1963.
html.) An infamously artful drinker, Debord vowed, two years later, not to pick up a glass 
until the book was complete. As to whether or not he stuck with such a pledge, one can 
never know. As he writes in a 1965 letter to Raoul Vanegeim: ‘For a month, although I 
ﬁnd myself quite happily occupied, I have subordinated many of the charms of everyday 
life and errancy to the completion of the critique of the spectacle. I have absolutely 
stopped drinking, until the last line is written. A digniﬁed example from Antiquity! 
[Digniﬁed] to the Thermopylae, and to the Spartans… In the best case, I still have six 
weeks or two months more. Which weighs upon me. But the trap I’ve caught myself 
in is clever’ (Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 3: Janvier 1965–Décembre 1968, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2003. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-
1August1966.html).
4. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 7: Janvier 1988–Novembre 1994, Paris: 
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For Debord, the society of the spectacle consists in a peculiar 
form of domination developed through the autonomy of the 
commodity economy within the capitalist mode of production in 
which human activity becomes structured by objective forms of 
appearance mediating social relations and yet is constituted by 
determinate modes of real, concrete practice. With the increas-
ing fragmentation of human experience through the division of 
labour and the structuring of social relations through the form 
of the commodity, the spectacle is for Debord the reconstitution 
of a unitary social life from its separated and disjointed moments 
at the level of appearances. In a word, the spectacle is a critical 
category of social organization specifying the multivalent aspects 
of the unity of capitalist society in relation to an underlying 
determinate structure of appearance, the conception of which 
derives from Hegelian thought.5
However, it remains the case that the extent to which Debord 
is justified in his claim that the spectacle constitutes a qualita-
tive development of capitalism has yet to be evaluated in accord-
ance with the categorial determinations of the capitalist mode 
of production. Is it true, as has sometimes been claimed, that 
Debord’s spectacle is simply a replacement for Marx’s commodity 
albeit under conditions of postwar prosperity? Is the difference 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2008. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-
6August1990.html.
5. While Debord invoked the category of spectacle as early as 1955, it is only in the 
1960s and ﬁnally within The Society of the Spectacle that it emerges as a critical concept 
for a structured totality. Beginning with ‘Introduction à une critique de la géographie 
urbaine’ in 1955, which appeared in number 6 of the Belgian surrealist journal Les Lèvres 
Nues, the category is utilized by Debord generically and in a nonpartisan manner to 
refer to publicity theatrics and the impressions and ambiances garnered from urban 
excursions. As might be expected, the term ‘spectator’ is also employed in a more 
commonplace capacity to refer to the subjectivity of passive reception. However, 
within the 1957 article ‘Rapport sur la construction des situations et sur les conditions 
de l’organisation et de l’action de la tendance situationniste international’, the category 
gets the speciﬁc deﬁnition of ‘non-intervention’ (Internationale Situationniste, 1997, p. 
699) in relation to which ‘[t]he construction of situations begins beyond the ruins of the 
modern spectacle’ (ibid.). It thereby begins to acquire a more technical meaning as a 
mode ‘psychological identiﬁcation’ (ibid.). It is within this early article – which was one of 
the preparatory texts for the July 1957 conference at Cosio d’Arroscia, Italy, at which the 
Situationist International was founded – that the spectacle emerges as ‘the spectacle of 
the capitalist way of life’ (ibid., p. 701).
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between Marx’s critique of political economy and Debord’s 
analysis of spectacle simply one of emphasis? Further, how does 
the spectacle relate to the other prominent forms of appear-
ance of value, such as money and, perhaps more importantly, 
capital?6 Finally, in what sense ought, as Debord writes in a 1966 
letter, ‘[t]he revolutionary theory of Marx … to be corrected and 
completed’?7
This essay attempts to answer these questions by highlight-
ing the central role of appearance-forms in Marx’s critique of 
political economy. Here, it will become clear that value – the 
social form of wealth within capitalist society – is ontologically 
structured as a totality through a set of appearance-form-
determinations (Erscheinung Formbestimmungen). As we know 
from Hegel, a totality cannot be given directly or immediately, 
and so what becomes primary is the form of value or, again, what 
Marx refers to in a number of places as Formbestimmung, form- 
determination.8 Here, value as formal determination or as the 
self-movement of form – not itself something directly perceptible 
and yet obtaining concrete appearances – derives from the 
self-reproducing logic of the totality of social relations necessary 
for the production and reproduction of capital.
The systematic exposition of Capital proceeds through a struc-
tured succession of categories that unfold immediate appearances 
to reveal their internal dynamics and, most crucially, the necessity 
through which essential social relations obtain the appearance-
forms they do. It is a mode of presentation (Darstellung) that 
examines social reality as a totality of inner connections and 
6. Gilles Dauvé, aka Jean Barrot, ‘Critique of the Situationist International’ (1979); 
translated by Louis Michaelson in Stewart Home, ed., What is Situationism? A Reader, 
Edinburgh: AK Press, 1996; and ‘Back to the Situationist International’ (1979), Aufheben 
no. 9 (2000). See also: Perspectives, At Dusk: The Situationist Movement in Historical 
Perspective, Berkeley CA: Perspectives, 1975.
7. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 3: Janvier 1965–Décembre 1968. Translation: nOt 
bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-26December1966a.html.
8. The concept Formbestimmung ﬁrst appears in Marx’s doctoral dissertation, but only 
re-emerges in the Grundrisse and the ﬁrst German edition of Capital, Volume 1.
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determinations. Marx’s Darstellung gives concrete conceptual 
unity to aggregated historical detail. It is a reconstruction that 
starts from the immediacies of how wealth appears within 
capitalist society and proceeds to unfold the mediating essence 
that is the retrospective ground for those forms of appearance.
It is through the logic of the forms of appearance 
(Erscheinungs formen) of value that Marx attempts to provide an 
answer to the problem as to why value must assume its particu-
lar forms. This is a question never posed by classical political 
economy and yet, as we learn from Marx, remains fundamental 
for explaining the mediations between, for example, profit and 
labour. This problem cannot be adequately answered without 
Hegel, specifically his Wesenslogik in which essence must appear 
as something other than itself. For Marx, this logic – through 
which the mutually constitutive identity of appearance and 
essence calls into question the limits of formal dualisms – is a 
conceptual resource for conceiving not only the necessity for 
surplus-value to appear as profit, but also the necessity of value 
to assume its particular concrete shapes, such as commodity, 
money and capital.9 
Not only does the concept of spectacle derive from this 
essentially Hegelian movement of the self-development of 
appearance-forms inherited by Marx, but in the first instance 
Marx’s usage contains insight already disposed towards, let us 
say, the spectacular. One can identify attributes of the Latin 
spectaculum, and its connection to a ‘mirror image’ or ‘arranged 
display’, and of spectare – ‘to view’, ‘watch’ or ‘behold’ – within 
the development of the forms of appearance of value.10 However, 
9. See Patrick Murray, Marx’s Theory of Scientific Knowledge. Amherst NY: Humanity 
Books, 1988, and ‘The Secret of Capital’s Self-Valorisation “Laid Bare”: How Hegel 
Helped Marx to Overturn Ricardo’s Theory of Proﬁt’, in Fred Moseley and Tony Smith, 
eds, Marx’s ‘Capital’ and Hegel’s ‘Logic’: A Reexamination, Leiden: Brill, 2014.
10. As Debord wrote in 1980 to a Greek translator of The Society of the Spectacle: ‘In 
French, “spectacle” has the merit of being linked to the Latin speculum and thus to mirror, 
to the inverted image, to the concept of speculation, etc.’ Guy Debord Correspondance, 
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this would at best only demonstrate that Debord is composing a 
theory of the spectacle by emphasizing certain methodological 
aspects of Marx’s critique of political economy. This is certainly 
true, and the gravity with which Debord aims to formulate a 
critique of society within the contours set by a Hegelian dialectic 
emerges as Debord scrutinizes different possible titles for The 
Society of the Spectacle:
La véritable société du spectacle
La dialectique de la société du spectacle
La dialectique de la société comme spectacle
La dialectique dans de la société du spectacle
La dialectique dans de la société comme spectacle
Le moment spectaculaire de la société marchande (ou sous-titre?)
La société comme spectacle11
Besides the connotations involved in these working titles and 
their affinity with the method of Marx’s critique of political 
economy, there are, in my view, some considerable advances 
made by Debord with his concept of spectacle, which I aim to 
elucidate here. This essay assesses the way in which Debord’s 
society of the spectacle remains a critical category that exceeds 
the specific determinations of the critique of political economy 
while yet having its conceptual basis within them.
Value and its spectacular forms of appearance
Let me begin with §10 of the first chapter of The Society of the 
Spectacle and consider some of the issues embedded there.12
Volume 6: Janvier 1979–Décembre 1987, Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 2006. Translation: 
nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-5August1980.html.
11. Within Debord’s archival materials, a rummage through his notations on Henri 
Lefebvre’s Sociology of Marx reveals these few additional working titles for what would 
eventually become The Society of the Spectacle.
12. This is a characterization of the spectacle that Debord will retain into the 1990s 
when he composed the preface to the third French edition of the book. Debord, The 
Society of the Spectacle, p. 8.
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Considered in its own terms, the spectacle is affirmation of 
appearance and affirmation of all human life, namely social life, as 
mere appearance. But the critique which reaches the truth of the 
spectacle exposes it as the visible negation of life, as a negation of 
life which has become visible. (§10)
What does it mean for a negation to gain positive form or 
obtain this appearance-form? For Debord, this is the result of 
the autonomous movement of the commodity economy in its 
abstract and quantitative structuring of social relations. But 
fully to grasp what this means, we have to tour Marx’s theory of 
the form of value. It is there that we will see how it is that the 
economy acquires this independent force of objectivity through 
its forms of appearance.
At the most elemental level, one recalls Marx’s descrip-
tion of the dual character of the commodity as a ‘sensuous 
super sensible’ (sinnlich übersinnlich) thing whereby, in Marx’s 
exposition, the unity of sensuous use-value and abstract 
exchange-value contained within the commodity unfold cor-
responding to concrete and abstract forms of human labour 
crystallized therein. Marx refers to this unity as value, a unity 
that becomes posited for itself when the products of labour are 
equalized in the exchange process; they are abstracted from their 
heterogeneous and concrete particularities by the reduction 
of the substance of their use-value to a quantum or aliquot of 
socially necessary abstract labour time, which is the measure of 
their value.
The use-values of two commodities become momentarily 
displaced during the exchange process. Value is thereby realized 
in the exchange process through the negation of use-value in 
which the qualitative aspects of the commodities are momentar-
ily expelled by the quantitative equivalence of exchange.13 And 
13. I am indebted to Christopher J. Arthur for this interpretation. Christopher J. Arthur, 
The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘Capital’, Leiden: Brill, 2004.
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yet, for Marx, this negation of use-value acquires a positive 
presence in the form of money and capital, each of which take 
possession of the materiality of production and consumption 
for the purpose of exchange. Within capitalism, production is 
production for exchange, and in this way the concreteness of the 
world is brought into existence by the abstract objective force 
of value. Here, the natural form of the commodity becomes its 
value-form as its form of appearance. As Marx writes:
Within the value-relation and the value expression included in it, the 
abstractly general counts not as a property of the concrete, sensibly 
real; but on the contrary the sensibly-concrete counts as the mere 
form of appearance or definite form of realisation of the abstractly 
general.14 
The constant expulsion and affirmation of concrete reality 
constitutes the essential movement of value, a process whereby the 
negation of use-value during exchange in turn objectifies itself, or 
negates its negation, by instantiating concrete reality through its 
development of forms (Gestaltungsprozess). It is an abstract empti-
ness acquiring concrete constitutive power. Such is the manner in 
which value gives itself its own concrete reality, an autonomy of 
real abstractions constituting the world in its own image.15
Debord’s opening chapter, ‘Separation Perfected’, continues 
within this framework. In so far as within capitalism social 
reality appears as an inverted world and subsists through 
estranged forms of abstract social unity, the spectacle is the 
14. ‘The Value-Form’, Appendix to the 1st German edition of Capital, Volume 1, 1867, in 
Capital and Class 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 130–50.
15. It should be noted that the category of real abstraction derives not from Marx 
himself but from Alfred Sohn-Rethel, even if its conceptual content can be traced to 
the former’s analysis of exchange abstraction and equalization. Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s 
Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology (1978; trans. Martin Sohn-
Rethel, Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press, 1983) examines the correlation between 
the social synthesis of the exchange abstraction, along with its anthropological genesis 
within antiquity, and the epistemological abstractions culminating in the philosophy 
of Kant. While there is no available evidence indicating that Debord was familiar with 
the work of Sohn-Rethel, that the concept of the society of the spectacle bears an 
unmistakable affinity to the concept of a real abstraction is undeniable.
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culmination of this fetish in which the ‘unity it imposes is merely 
the official language of generalized separation’ (§3).16 Debord aims 
to elucidate an autonomized social reality constituted through 
appearances, wherein social unity only exists in its inverted 
form. As such, the spectacle is not a falsified representation of 
reality, but the visual or phenomenal exposition of an already 
falsified reality; it is the development of value becoming visible 
to itself. As will become clear, the spectacle is not a distorted 
representation of social reality but the appearance and justifica-
tion of the actual distortion or perversion of social reality itself. 
As Debord writes in the second chapter: ‘The spectacle is the 
moment when the commodity has attained the total occupation 
of social life. Not only is the relation to the commodity visible, 
but it is all one sees: the world one sees is its world’ (§42).
However, if we are to regard the spectacle as a visualization 
of the world of commodities, then the category of the com-
modity itself does not yet obtain the characteristics Debord is 
describing. We need instead to traverse the varied capacities and 
functions of money. Indeed, while the commodity features as a 
more prominent protagonist in The Society of the Spectacle, on 
the surface of things, I’d like to argue that it is actually different 
aspects of the logic of money which better elucidate the spectacle 
as a development of the capitalist mode of production. 
The spectacular nature of money
For Marx, the forms of appearance of value proceed through 
‘visual inspection’ or Augenschein. This is Marx’s formulation 
16. In the analysis to follow, it is worth bearing in mind the affinity between the 
concepts of separation and abstraction. While Debord relies more heavily on the former, 
the Latin abstrahere is always a process of separation and so it might speculatively be said 
that an alternative title to the ﬁrst chapter of The Society of the Spectacle – one which 
would have equally encompassed its content while making more explicit the form of 
domination constituted by the spectacle in its continuity with the value-form – would 
have been ‘Abstraction Perfected’.
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which comes to the fore most explicitly in the first chapter of the 
first German edition of Capital and the ‘Value-Form’ Appendix to 
that edition. There, it is appearances themselves that commence 
the dialectic on the forms of value: ‘Der Augenschein lehrt 
ferner’. In a sense, Marx is simply observing (betrachtet) their 
development. Among the initial passages of Capital, Volume 1, 
the Erscheinungsformen proceed through four basic moments – a 
dramaturgy between coat and linen – progressively gaining 
greater visual impact through a totalization of commodity values 
and culminating in the money-form whose fetish-riddle, as Marx 
writes, is ‘the riddle of the commodity fetish, [but] now become 
visible and dazzling to our eyes’.17 In other words, the money-
fetish is only the commodity-fetish rendered spectacular.
Prior to this, Marx’s exposition has traversed the simple form 
of relative value for which the being of value only ‘comes to 
light’ (kommt dagegen zum Vorschein) as a relation between two 
commodities, whereby their equal relation posits, on one side, 
‘the body of another commodity, sensibly different from it [and] 
becomes the mirror [Spiegel] of its own existence as value [Wert-
sein]’. Here, value ‘reveals itself ’ (offenbart sich), or receives sensual 
expression (erhält sinnlichen Ausdruck), in the relation between 
commodities; that is, one commodity’s use-value becomes the 
form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) or the objective reflection 
of the value of another commodity.
Second, Marx proceeds to the equivalent form of value, which 
unlike future editions already broaches the discussion of the 
fetish character of commodities whose mystical form elicits 
the famous optical metaphor in which subjective impressions 
are explicable ‘not as a subjective stimulation of the optic nerve 
itself, but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye’. The 
equivalent form is, as Marx states, a ‘reflection determination’ of 
17. Capital, Volume 1, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 35, 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1996, p. 103, translation amended.
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the use-value of other commodities. In his example, linen ‘sees 
itself ’ as equivalent to the coat. There is a reciprocal and mirror-
ing relation of opposites in the relative and equivalent forms of 
value.
Third, Marx proceeds to the developed form of relative value 
in which the form of value becomes an environment of com-
modities. Here we find the proliferation of many simple relative 
value expressions. The accidental character of the equation of 
two commodities immediately falls away to reveal an ‘indefinite, 
constantly extendable series of its relative value-expressions [and] 
the linen relates itself to all possible commodity-bodies as mere 
form of appearance of the labour which is contained in itself ’. 
Within this emergent world of commodities, the body of each 
becomes a mirror (Spiegel) for a universal equivalent.
Finally, Marx follows this series of developments into a situ-
ation in which the totality of values can now attain the appear-
ance of exchange-values or what he calls the universal relative 
form of value. In this process, one commodity as a specific 
equivalent within the world or environment of relative forms of 
value remains. Marx is now tracing the developing money-form 
of value out of the equivalent form’s position within the univer-
sal relative form of value. Here emerges the universal (allgemeine) 
equivalent, the universal and yet individuated materialization of 
abstract human labour whose use-value is precisely its universal 
form of value as a universal equivalent. All commodities thereby 
‘mirror’ or ‘reflect’ themselves in one and the same commodity as 
quantities of value. 
Within this development, what appears as Marx’s frequent use 
of visual similes cannot simply be regarded as a stylistic pecu-
liarity. For instance, there is a determinate reflective structure 
between two commodities in the relative form of value; in turn, 
the equivalent form reflects within itself the relative use-value 
of all other commodities; the universal equivalent is the visible 
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incarnation or ‘reflection determination’ (Reflexionbestimmung) of 
the totality of commodities in which the body and use-value of 
each become mirrors (Spiegel) for the universal equivalent.18
It is, however, within the form of money that the spectacular 
nature of the value-form finds its most potent expression. 
Indeed, money emerges as a great visual embodiment and display 
of all that has preceded it. It can, in my view, be argued that 
money within the capitalist mode of production is spectacular in 
nature. There are three aspects to Marx’s theory of money that, 
in my view, coalesce under the concept of spectacle, or, rather, 
three important elements inherited from the money-form of 
value that come to constitute the spectacle: (1) money as the 
objective visualization of value; (2) money as an omnipotent 
purchasing power and therewith in a monopoly on use-value; 
(3) money as Gemeinwesen, which, as we’ll see, is always already 
capital. But let me now briskly traverse these three aspects before 
discussing the relation between spectacle and capital.
Money as the visualization of value
The money-form necessarily follows from the exchange relation 
in so far as the exchange-value of commodities needs to acquire 
an objective existence. In fact, money emerges as the external-
ized community of commodities, the appearance of their unity 
given an independent existence. As a necessary and observable 
form of appearance of the total social labour within capitalism, 
money is the mirror in which the value of all commodities finds 
determinate reflection. Because every commodity receives its 
18. Within the ﬁrst German edition of Capital, Volume 1, Marx makes clear that his 
usage of categories of reflection derives from what Hegel terms Reflexionbestimmung 
in his Wesenslogik. Marx offers the following analogy: ‘There is something special about 
such reflection-determinations. This man is, for example, only King, because other men 
behave towards him like subjects. They believe, however, that they are subjects because 
he is King.’ Karl Marx, ‘The Commodity’ [ﬁrst chapter of the ﬁrst German edition of 
Capital], trans. Albert Dragstedt, 1976, www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/
commodity.htm; translation amended).
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status in relation to all others, money appears, in Marx’s exposi-
tion, as the actualization of commodity homogeneity and com-
mensurability, the visual embodiment of the relation between all 
commodities. As Marx writes, through the money-form, value 
remains ‘everywhere visible’; it is ‘the social resumé of the world 
of commodities’.19
It is within money that value obtains its most visible incarna-
tion. Important to emphasize here is that money is not, strictly 
speaking, the representation of the value of commodities, but an 
exposition of their relation as values. It is the presented actuality 
of the unity of value. As Marx writes, 
It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other 
actual animals, which form when grouped together the various 
kinds, species, subspecies, families etc. of the animal kingdom, there 
existed also in addition the animal, the individual incarnation of the 
entire animal kingdom. Such a particular which contains within 
itself all really present species of the same entity is a universal (like 
animal, god, etc.).20
Money is the necessary presentation of value for itself, not as 
a representation of value but its visual presence.21 This further 
entails the way in which Marx is not conceiving a nominalist 
theory of money, or money as a mere symbol of value. Money is 
not a stand-in or reference for commodity values, but the totality 
of their relations given an independent form. If anything, money 
19. Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Karl Marx and 
Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 29, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987, p. 337; 
Capital, Volume 1, p. 79.
20. Marx, ‘The Commodity’ .
21. Christopher J. Arthur, ‘Value and Money’, in Fred Moseley, ed., Marx’s Theory of 
Money: Modern Appraisals, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Hans-Georg Backhaus, 
Dialektik der Wertform: Untersuchungen zur Marxschen Ökonomiekritik, Freiburg: Caira, 
1997; Ricardo Belloﬁore, ‘From Marx to Minsky: The Universal Equivalent, Finance to 
Production and the Deepening of the Real Subsumption of Labor under Capital in Money 
Manager Capitalism’, in Heiner Ganßmann, ed., New Approaches to Monetary Theory: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 191–211; Michael Heinrich, Die 
Wissenschaft vom Wert, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1995; Christian Lotz, The 
Capitalist Schema: Time, Money and the Culture of Abstraction, Lanham MD: Lexington 
Books, 2014; Helmut Reichelt, Neue Marx Lektüre – Zur Kritik sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Logik, Hamburg: VSA, 2008.
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liberates itself as a form of representation and in turn transforms 
everything around it into its representative. As Marx writes, in 
money ‘everything is turned around, and all actual products … 
become the representation of money’.22
Through this aspect of money, which doesn’t conceal the real 
material content of economic relations but instead makes them 
phenomenologically actual, it becomes clear in what sense the 
spectacle cannot be conceived as a manipulation or distorted 
representation of the world – that is, a conspiratorial or inten-
tional effort to mystify the world, or merely the technological 
capacity to disseminate images. Nor does the category refer to 
any semiological aspect of the commodity economy. Instead, like 
the monetary instantiation of value, the spectacle is a social rela-
tion rendered into a materially objective force: ‘a Weltanschauung 
which has become actual, materially translated. It is a world 
vision which has become objectified’ (§5). It is a category that 
elucidates the abstract form of domination constituted by the 
Erscheinungsformen of value and its development into an objective 
phenomenal form. 
Money as the monopoly on use-value
I move on now to a second aspect of money that is inherited 
by the spectacle. The value of money in the first instance is 
money’s purchasing power: that is, what money can command. 
As a universal equivalent, it can potentially purchase anything, 
even that which does not appear on the market. Further, while 
all commodities might not be products of labour, all are capable 
of acquiring a price-form.23 As such, money is a universality that 
22. Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 28, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986, p. 126. 
23. As Marx elaborates: ‘The price form, however, is not only compatible with the 
possibility of a quantitative incongruity between magnitude of value and price, i.e., 
between the former and its expression in money, but it may also conceal a qualitative 
inconsistency, so much so, that, although money is nothing but the value form of 
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renders in principle everything in the universe exchangeable 
with everything else. Its use-value is precisely its capacity to 
exchange the totality of use-values. Money is ‘an appropriate 
expression of equivalence in the infinite variety of use-values’. 
Money is ‘the essence of all the use values’. It is for this reason 
that Marx describes money as the ‘absolute commodity’ or ‘the 
ubiquitous [allgegenwärtige] commodity’.24 As already anticipated 
in the ‘Power of Money’ section of the 1844 Manuscripts, money is 
the means of purchase, that which gives access to all objects and 
the only true need.25 Here, money as a means of purchase grants 
it its mystifying and omnipotent power; it is the medium under 
which all needs are potentially met. In fact, money emerges as 
the only true objective need governing the rest.
Within the second chapter of The Society of the Spectacle, 
Debord begins to address the relationship between the spectacle 
and use-value or social need. Between §§46 and 47, Debord 
brings his diagnosis closer to the form-determinations of 
value. Here, the relation of exchange-value and use-value are 
constituted through a relation of subsumption, wherein use 
appears as internal to exchange, a development most clearly 
illustrated in Marx’s identified ‘four peculiarities’ or ‘inversions’ 
of the equivalent form of value. As Debord writes, ‘mobilizing 
all human use and establishing a monopoly over its satisfaction, 
exchange value has ended up directing use’ (§46). Subordinated to 
exchange, use becomes inseparably appended to the production 
commodities, price ceases altogether to express value. Objects that in themselves are 
no commodities, such as conscience, honour, &c, are capable of being offered for sale by 
their holders, and of thus acquiring, through their price, the form of commodities. Hence 
an object may have a price without having value.’ Capital, Volume 1, p. 112.
24. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 281; Economic 
Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 200; A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 374; 
Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 164.
25. ‘By possessing the property of buying everything, by possessing the property of 
appropriating all objects, money is thus the object of eminent possession. The universality 
of its property is the omnipotence of its being. It is therefore regarded as an omnipotent 
being. Money is the procurer between man’s need and the object, between his life and 
his means of life.’ Karl Marx, ‘The Power of Money’, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works, vol. 3, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, p. 323.
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of exchange-value – that is, to an utterly abstract and quantita-
tive criterion. The spectacle here subjects concrete human 
needs to its own standard, as a form of appearance wherein the 
abstract assumes the shape of the concrete. 
So here the spectacle follows again an aspect of money in 
so far as it is by no means an idealist optical illusion, but the 
determinate reflection of the relations among all other com-
modities, the ontologically objective actuality of relationality 
that gives structure and meaning to all empirical existence. It 
is in this way that Debord can characterize, in a 1969 letter, 
the spectacle as ‘a moment in the development of the world of 
the commodity’.26 This moment is the Gestalt of money which 
renders a world of commodities possible. The visible material 
world is in fact the determinate reflection, or spectacular image, 
of general equivalence which structures that world’s concrete 
and differentiated heterogeneity. This framework elicits a situa-
tion in which reflection becomes reality itself and the matter and 
use-values reflected as ephemeral appearance. As Marx writes, 
money is ‘the external, common medium and faculty for turning 
an image into reality and reality into a mere image’.27
Within this framework, Debord identifies a ‘tendency of use 
value to fall’ (§47), appropriating Marx’s own formulation of 
the rate of profit and referring to a loss of the autonomy of use 
from exchange. As Debord writes, ‘use in its most impoverished 
form (food and lodging) today exists only to the extent that it is 
imprisoned in the illusory wealth of increased survival. The real 
consumer becomes a consumer of illusions. The commodity is 
26. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 4: Janvier 1969–Décembre 1972, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004. Translation: nOt bOred! www.notbored.org/debord-
6August1990.html.
27. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3, p. 325. In the words of 
Engels, money is a ‘magic potion that can transform itself at will into anything desirable 
and desired’, and all other forms of wealth are ‘mere semblances compared with this 
incarnation of wealth as such’. Frederick Engels, Origins of the Family, Private Property, 
and the State (1884), in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 26, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1990, p. 266.
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this factually real illusion, and the spectacle is its general mani-
festation’ (§47, emphasis added)
Debord’s second chapter builds from the exchange relation 
not just the spectacle as the prevailing model of social life, but 
that through the analysis of use-value as internal to exchange-
value the spectacle serves also as the total justification or 
legitimation of the existing system and ensures the permanent 
presence of that justification. In this way, the spectacle is both 
the embodiment of existing social meaning and its verification. 
As Debord writes:
In the inverted reality of the spectacle, use value (which was 
implicitly contained in exchange value) must now be explicitly 
proclaimed precisely because its factual reality is eroded by the 
overdeveloped commodity economy and because counterfeit life 
requires a pseudo-justification. (§48)
So in this chapter we find that the spectacle refers to a pseudo-
autonomy of use as it is emphatically lauded in order to justify 
the reigning domination of the commodity. As Debord will 
later write in the third chapter, ‘The satisfaction which no 
longer comes from the use of abundant commodities is now 
sought in the recognition of their value as commodities: the 
use of commodities becomes sufficient unto itself ’ (§67). Here 
again we find as a model the money-form whose use-value is its 
power of exchangeability. The spectacle asserts itself where the 
shadow of use has reappeared in its inverted form: the economy 
appears as an objective reality which mediates between need and 
satisfaction.28 However, this is, to borrow a phrase from Adorno, 
28. Additionally, within this ‘fraud of satisfaction’ (§70), the constitution of human 
needs within the movement of value cannot be contrasted with any opposing ‘natural’ 
or ‘authentic’ needs and desires. It is rather the case that social existence, in its real 
subsumption within the self-producing development of the commodity-form, becomes 
recalibrated as mediated moments within the autonomous economy. ‘The pseudo-need 
imposed by modern consumption clearly cannot be opposed by any genuine need or 
desire which is not itself shaped by society and its history. The abundant commodity 
stands for the total breach in the organic development of social needs. Its mechanical 
accumulation liberates unlimited artiﬁciality, in the face of which living desire is helpless. 
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the socially necessary semblance of an epoch wherein need and 
its satisfaction are merely the determinate and subordinated 
moments which mediate an economy developing for itself outside 
of anyone’s control. Through this framework it becomes clear 
that the spectacle entails the commensurable identification 
with the predominant images of social need constituted in and 
through the money structure.29 In this way, while reiterating 
the trifling distinction between ‘superficial needs and deep needs’, 
the spectacle erects a model of social satisfaction integral to its 
domination. It is from this perspective that ‘[s]pectators do not 
find what they desire; they desire what they find’.30
This analysis, in my view, comprises an advance beyond Marx 
with regard to the way in which the category of the spectacle 
elicits a sustained critique of use-value and need satisfaction, 
thereby sidelining what Hafner has called the tendency of 
‘use-value fetishism’ (Gebrauchswertfetischismus).31 From that 
perspective, one finds descriptions for the decay or degradation 
of use-value by exchange extrinsically eroded by market forces, 
The cumulative power of independent artiﬁciality sows everywhere the falsiﬁcation of 
social life’ (§68). Further explication on the distinction between ‘superﬁcial’ and ‘genuine’ 
needs as a tenet of class society can be found in Adorno’s ‘Thesen über Bedürfnis (1942), 
in Adorno Soziologische Schriften II, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
29. Debord identiﬁes the advent of the spectacle proper with the period after the 
‘second industrial revolution’, which ran from the late nineteenth century until World 
War I, the historical moment in which ‘alienated consumption becomes for the masses 
a duty supplementary to alienated production’ (§42). At this point, roughly from the 
beginning of the 1920s and accelerating after World War II, the economy must no longer 
disregard the manner in which its working class satisﬁes its needs. Focused efforts 
on cultivating the consuming aspect of the proletariat, rather than simply ignoring it, 
inaugurated a deeper integration of the proletariat into the accumulation process. For 
Debord, the historical speciﬁcity of the modern spectacle unfolding in accordance with 
the development of the autonomy of the commodity can thereby be witnessed through 
a greater absorption of labour into the circulation sphere, an effort devoted strictly to 
the realization of surplus value, rather than to its creation. As Debord writes, ‘as soon as 
the production of commodities reaches a level of abundance which requires a surplus of 
collaboration from the worker’ (§43), consumption in general becomes, as the proletariat 
gains greater access to the total commodity, a dialectical determination of capitalist 
production, or, said another way, the real subsumption of use in – and the abstractions 
of – commodity exchange.
30. Guy Debord, Complete Cinematic Works: Scripts, Stills and Document (1978), trans. 
and ed., Ken Knabb. Edinburgh: AK Press, 2003, p. 114. 
31. Kornelia Hafner, ‘Gebrauchswertfetischismus’, in Diethard Behrens, ed., Gesellschaft 
und Erkenntnis: zur materialistischen Erkenntnis- und Ökonomiekritik, Freiburg: Çaira-
Verlag, 1993, pp. 59–88.
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a theme frequently found within Critical Theory but one which 
emerges as prominent in the work of Helmut Reinicke, Wolfgang 
Pohrt, Stefan Breuer and even Hans-Jürgen Krahl.32
As the complement to money, the spectacle detaches the use-
value of money as the medium of circulation, itself the necessary 
universal equivalent of all commodities, and establishes a 
pseudo-autonomy of use in general as a category for society as a 
whole. If money is the realization of exchange-value’s negation 
of use, then the spectacle is the return of use, now draped in a 
counterfeit independence. The spectacle is the appearance of 
value as use in its sovereignty while unrelentingly still drain-
ing the world of its detail. It is thereby as both the objective 
visualization of value and its monopoly on use that Debord can 
describe the spectacle as ‘the money which one only looks at, 
because in the spectacle the totality of use is already exchanged 
for the totality of abstract representation’ (§49).
Money as Gemeinwesen
There is one other aspect of money that helps us understand 
the relation between spectacle and capital. For Marx, since the 
money-form of value is the concrete actualization of general 
equivalence, society appears as unified and as a whole within 
money. In money, one sees both, in the words of Anitra Nelson, 
‘the universality of the estrangement of individuals from them-
selves and from others’ and ‘the universality and generality of all 
their relations and abilities.’33 However, for Debord and within 
32. Helmut Reinicke, Revolte im bürgerlichen Erbe: Gebrauchswert und Mikrologie, 
Gießen: Achenbach, 1975; Wolfgang Pohrt, Zur Theorie des Gebrauchswerts oder über die 
Vergänglichkeit der historischen Voraussetzungen, unter denen das Kapital Gebrauchswert 
setzt, Frankfurt am Main: Syndikat, 1976; Stefan Breuer, Die Krise der Revolutionstheorie. 
Negative Vergesellschaftung und Arbeitsmetaphysik bei Herbert Marcuse, Frankfurt 
am Main: Syndikat, 1977; Hans-Jürgen Krahl, ‘Bemerkungen zur Akkumulation und 
Krisentendenz des Kapitals’, in Konstitution und Klassenkampf, Frankfurt am Main: Neue 
Kritik,1971, pp. 82–97.
33. Anitra Nelson, Marx’s Concept of Money: The God of Commodities, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999, p. 70.
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the spectacle, society is capable of appearing unified every-
where, not just in the money-form but ‘where the totality of the 
commodity world appears as a whole, as a general equivalence 
for what the entire society can be and can do’ (§49). How this 
relates to capital requires a look at money’s function as a unified 
Gemeinwesen. 
In the Grundrisse, Marx discusses, among the functions of 
money, its third determination from which it is distinct as both 
a measure of value and a means of circulation. Here money 
appears as an end-in-itself, ‘money as money’ or as ‘the universal 
material representative of wealth’ (universeller materieller Repräsent-
ant des Reichtums).34 Marx describes this third determination 
as the unity of the previous functions of money and which, as 
an end-in-itself, cannot be confined to the sphere of circulation. 
This third determination is already latent capital, albeit only 
by preserving its fluid becoming and by withdrawing and re-
entering the sphere of circulation. In a word, for exchange-value 
to become truly autonomous as money it needs to develop into 
capital; that is, it must exit and re-enter circulation and aspire 
to imperishability. Money that is made autonomous and results 
from circulation as exchange value but that re-enters circulation 
and perpetuates and valorizes itself is capital. That is, only in 
capital has money lost its rigidity and become a process. And, 
of course, the specific exchange through which money becomes 
capital and not simply a commodity is in the purchasing of 
labour-power, the use-value that money purchases in order 
to become capital through the immediate unity of the labour 
process and the valorization process.
34. Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 151. Within the Grundrisse, the 
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy and Capital, Volume 1, Marx discusses this 
concept of ‘money as money’ in terms of three predominant sub-determinations: (1) 
hoard; (2) means of debt repayment; (3) means of payment in international trade, i.e. 
world money.
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Here, within the transition to capital, money is no longer 
simply independent exchange-value but the autonomy of 
exchange-value as ‘self-positing’ (selbstsetzende): ‘money must be 
spent for productive consumption, that is it must be engaged 
in reproducing exchange-value.’35 Within M–C–M�, money is 
‘exchange-value-for-itself ’ (Der Tauschwert als sich selbstsetzende 
Bewegung). Money as capital is independent of circulation and 
activates production with the purchase of labour-power. Capital 
must exist in both production and circulation, as both commod-
ity and money.
In its becoming capital, money becomes the community or the 
social bond. ‘It is itself the community, and cannot tolerate any 
other standing above it. But this implies the full development 
of exchange value, hence of a social organisation corresponding 
to it.’ As Marx continues, money is ‘the real community, in so 
far as it is the general material of existence for all, and also the 
communal product of all’.36 It is in this way that capital becomes 
society, a development which includes the real subsumption 
of the labour process by the valorization process. The form-
determination of value strives to make itself a unified totality.37 
We can trace this aspiration first through Capital, Volume 1, in 
which Marx defines capital as value-in-process, then through 
circulating capital as the identity of variable and constant 
capital within Capital, Volume 2, and finally, within both Capital, 
Volume 3, and the Grundrisse, capital is defined as the unity of the 
35. Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, p. 113.
36. Ibid., pp. 155 and 158. Here again we ﬁnd money as the monopoly of use-value, as 
that which ‘satisﬁes every need, in that it can be exchanged for the object of every need 
[and is] quite indifferent to every particularity’ (ibid., 153). Money possesses every natural 
particularity of commodities. Money, as general wealth, is therefore the totality of 
need which ‘can embody the possibility of all pleasures.’ (ibid., 155); it is ‘the god among 
commodities’ representing ‘the celestial [himmlische] existence of commodities, while 
they represent [darstellen] its earthy [irdische] existence’ (ibid., p. 154).
37. Camatte writes: ‘[s]o capital exercises an absolute domination over society, 
and tends to become society … The opposition is no longer between capital and 
previous modes of production, but between a fraction of capital and capital itself, the 
presupposition of the production and circulation processes.’ Jacques Camatte, This World 
We Must Leave and Other Essays, Brooklyn NY: Autonomedia, 1995, p. 123.
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production and circulation processes. In a word, capital becomes 
the form of value that constitutes itself as society. We are now 
able to directly engage the relation between capital and the 
society of the spectacle.
Capital as spectacle
The spectacle cannot be reduced to the commodity because 
the commodity does not by itself yield the objective autonomy 
of exchange-value. This only occurs through the advent of the 
money-form. And yet the spectacle cannot be reduced to money 
since it is not a phenomenon confined to the sphere of circula-
tion. Money only exits circulation as capital (money-capital). So, 
is the spectacle synonymous with capital or, more specifically, 
with value-in-process? I would argue that it is not, and not 
simply for the way in which Debord identifies some pre-capitalist 
tendencies of the spectacle, themes which unfortunately I cannot 
go into here.38
I have indicated that the spectacle incorporates, from the 
commodity, exchangeability as the dominant mode of social 
synthesis.39 More important, however, are the tripartite aspects 
of money outlined above: (1) as the visual objectification and 
actuality of inverted social relations; (2) as the essence of all use-
values; (3) as the unified social whole or the unity of appearance-
forms – that is, as capital. However, the purview of The Society of 
the Spectacle traverses an array of social phenomena not directly 
reducible to the category of capital. These broadly include the 
38. It is worth noting that alongside these developments Debord also sketches the 
historical origins of the spectacle within both religious projection and the phenomenon 
of specialization, both of which have at their foundation a social division of labour 
requisite for the production and exchange of commodities. The emergence of a 
specialized segment of priests within society, and the religious fetishism wielded 
therewith, can be explicable, at least partially, in terms of a social division of labour and a 
class conﬁguration.
39. It is for this that it can accurately be said that ‘the concept of spectacle assumes 
the methodological importance which the category of commodity has for Marx’. 
Perspectives, At Dusk: The Situationist Movement in Historical Perspective, p. 38.
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spectacular appearance of seemingly opposed political factions, 
the spectacular image of individuality as advertised celebrity 
personalities (chapter 3), the spectacular representation of the 
proletariat in various organizational forms (chapter 4), the spec-
tacular appearance time structured by commodity production 
and circulation (chapters 5–6), the spectacular composition of the 
urban environment (chapter 7), the spectacular presentation of 
cultural products and discourses (chapter 8) and the spectacular 
rendering of ideology (chapter 9). These are only a few of the 
aspects of social life that the multivalent category of spectacle is 
meant to critically examine, none of which can be easily reduced 
to the category of capital.
One of Debord’s most explicit connections between capital 
and the spectacle comes at the end of the first chapter. There he 
writes: ‘The spectacle is capital to such a degree of accumulation 
that it becomes image’ (Le spectacle est le capital à un tel degré 
d’accumulation qu’il devient image) (§34). How are we to under-
stand such a formulation? After all, from the perspective of 
value as the unity of the forms of appearance, capital is already 
‘image’, understood here as Erscheinung. A solution to this cryptic 
thesis can be found, in my view, by recalling the aforementioned 
discussion of the money-form of value. That is, just as money 
was the becoming visible of commodity relations in their totality, 
the spectacle is for Debord the becoming visible of capital as a 
totality, but not simply as the monetization of capital since this 
would be a redundant formulation. Capital is already the move-
ment of money.40 Instead, the spectacle as the becoming visible 
40. The ﬁnal thesis of the opening chapter of The Society of the Spectacle has 
frequently confounded interpreters regarding whether it is the commodity or capital-
form of value that has greater import for Debord’s theory of the spectacle. See Gilles 
Dauvé, aka Jean Barrot, ‘Critique of the Situationist International’ (1979), trans. Louis 
Michaelson, in Home, ed., What is Situationism? A Reader; and ‘Back to the Situationist 
International’. However, to cite just one example of Debord’s sensitivity regarding the 
subtleties of the categories of the critique of political economy, the following polemical 
remarks waged against Raoul Vaneigem following the dissolution of the SI are indicative: 
‘We come across another gem further on when he discovers that “what weighs upon us 
is no longer capital, but the logic of the commodity”. He knows full well that Marx did 
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of capital is the becoming visible of the unity of appearances – 
that is, the mode of appearance of society unified under capital. 
However, do not let the term ‘visibility’ suggest that the spectacle 
is a concept primarily concerned with literally visual imagery 
or is reducible to an environment oversaturated with advertise-
ments or consumerism. Visibility here refers back to the riddle 
of the money-fetish – to the inverted world become, in Marx’s 
words, ‘dazzling to our eyes’. In this way, the spectacle remains 
a category that critically elucidates the abstract form of domina-
tion constituted by the exchange relations of the capitalist mode 
of production and yet carries this structure well beyond solely 
‘economic’ relations. As Debord writes: ‘Capital is no longer the 
invisible center determining the mode of production.’ Under the 
spectacle, ‘[s]ociety in its length and breadth becomes capital’s 
faithful portrait’ (§50).
The notion that human beings are deprived of any substance 
not imported by the form-determination of value, and therewith 
structured by appearances, derives from Marx’s critique of politi-
cal economy. However, from the perspective of the concept of 
spectacle, the totalizing implications of this general movement of 
appearance were not theoretically carried through. Central here 
is the manner in which the full autonomy of appearance-forms 
only arises with the emergence of fictitious or interest-bearing 
capital in which capital returns to the form in which it first arose 
as money and begets more money seemingly as a result only of 
itself or the increase in value directly from circulation. Here, the 
production process effectively disappears, and for Marx it is the 
culmination of the form-determinations in which everything is 
reduced to circulation.41 However, it remains the case for Marx 
not wait for him to demonstrate that capital was merely “the logic of the commodity”; 
even so, he reckoned naively on his phrase having a modern sound to it.’ Situationist 
International, 2003, p. 127.
41. ‘In interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-expanding value, 
money generating money, is brought out in its pure form and in this form it no longer 
bears the birthmarks of its origin.’ Marx, Capital, Volume 3, in Karl Marx and Frederick 
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that this ‘completion of fetish capital’42 nevertheless is intrinsi-
cally related and dependent upon relations of production. It can 
therefore be said that Marx, in his analysis of capital, renders 
explicit the necessity of the relations between appearance-forms 
and essential social relations. 
However, the manner in which forms of appearance detach 
themselves and come to reconstitute real concrete social 
relations indexes their triumph as social reality and therewith 
solicits the demand to examine how the autonomy and move-
ment of appearances might come to pervade all aspects of social 
life. It is here that the category of the spectacle is of service. 
The major distinction to be made between the development of 
value in its particular forms of appearance and the spectacle is 
that, unlike the fetish-character of value, there is no masquerade 
operative in its mystification. The spectacle has a sole demand: 
that social reality appear in all of its transparency.
Recall that the spectacle adopts the mandate of exchange-
value: everything is possible because everything is equivalent. 
As the negation of life and of concrete reality that has become 
visible qua appearance, the spectacle follows the objective 
form-determinations of value by asserting a positive presence 
as the determinate negation of use-value. For this, the spectacle 
makes visible a world that is at once both present and absent. 
The spectacle, as that which is beheld, refers to the identity of 
the non-identical of exchange value not merely as operative, but 
as disclosed. It is the commodity social form ‘shown for what it 
is’ (§37), a display of alienation in its utmost clarity. As Debord 
writes, ‘[n]ot only is the relation to the commodity visible but it 
is all one sees: the world one sees is its world’ (§42). 
Engels, Collected Works, vol. 37, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998, p. 389, translation 
amended.
42. As Marx writes: ‘Here the fetish form of capital and the representation 
[Vorstellung] of fetish capital are complete. In M–M� we have the meaningless 
[begriffslose] form of capital, the perversion [Verkehrung] and materialisation of 
production relations in their highest degree’. Ibid., p. 390, translation amended.
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As a structure of disclosure constitutive of its object, the 
spectacle is a luminosity unfolding upon the terrain of the false. 
Within the spectacle, social activity is made to appear, and in 
doing so is embedded with a meaning that contains both the 
image and the goal of social development under commodity 
society. Through the spectacle, the portrait of capital becomes all 
of society, for which ‘[a]t the moment of economic abundance, the 
concentrated result of social labor becomes visible and subjugates 
all reality to appearance, which is now its product’ (§50). In the 
words of Jacques Camatte: ‘The spectacle has to show humans 
what they are, or what they must be’, in which the human 
being becomes ‘no more than a ritual of capital’.43 Here, capital 
becomes ‘the mirror of all representations’, divorced from any 
dependency on its transubstantiations and reproducing itself, in 
part, through the form determinations of its forms of appear-
ance.44 Capital becomes spectacle to the extent that, as a social 
reality, only the forms of appearance persist. For both Camatte 
and Debord, this movement of capital – as self-valorizing value 
or as a self-developing form of appearance without substance 
43. Camatte, This World We Must Leave and Other Essays, pp. 170, 108–9. Camatte is 
an important resource for illustrating the way in which objective forms of appearance 
come to dominate social relations within capitalist society. While there was no direct 
correspondence between Debord and Camatte, their respective analyses comprise a 
similar picture. Camatte came out of the political tradition of Italian left communism, 
strongly influenced by early Italian Communist Party member Amadeo Bordiga, and 
argued that capital had anthropomorphized itself as a material community. Camatte, 
who has barely received any attention from the anglophone world, never claimed any 
affinity with Socialisme ou Barbarie or the Situationist International because they were 
formal organizations and, in his eyes, held to outdated council communist programmes. 
Debord, for his part, left no evidence of any contact with Camatte. In a passage that 
could have appeared within The Society of the Spectacle, Camatte writes: ‘Capital has 
become absolute representation: everything men do is reflected in it; it can be the 
spectacle of the world in that it reflects, returns to all beings their various movements 
integrated into its life process.’ Jacques Camatte, Capital and Community (1976), trans. 
David Brown, New York: First Prism Key Press, 2011, pp. 339–40. The affinity with Debord 
is unmistakable. In another passage, which in all likelihood is a direct appropriation of §17 
of The Society of the Spectacle, Camatte writes: ‘They are stripped of their activity, which 
is restored to them in the form of representations; the movement of alienation no longer 
bears on the being or the having, but on appearing: their life is organized for them, and 
thus they increasingly tend to perceive of themselves as being thrown into non-life.’ 
Camatte, Capital and Community, p. 252.
44. Camatte, Capital and Community, p. 251.
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– proceeds to an anthropomorphization, which both capitalizes 
human beings and humanizes capital.
Reichelt reminds us that Marx’s various formulations about 
the phantasmic cannot be mere rhetoric, but refer to features 
of reality, wherein ‘[r]eality is inversion, is appearance, in which 
reason, in its inverted forms of existence, subsists contradictorily 
through – estranged – forms of social unity.’45 Correspondingly, 
Debord’s concept of the spectacle follows such an analysis and 
amounts, in my view, to the most developed form of this unifica-
tion within twentieth-century Marxism. The spectacle is the 
appearance of social unity in which separate spheres of social 
life, although dependent on capitalist production, have reached 
an accord that synthetically organizes each of its moments into 
a totality. For this, Debord aims to fully outline the contours 
of what Adorno called that ‘diabolical image of harmony’.46 
Important to recall here is the way in which the spectacle is less 
a critical theory of appearances than it is a theory of the unity 
or organization of appearance-forms. A justification for one of 
its moments is a justification for its entirety. It is the name for 
the reigning identity of production and consumption, of work 
and leisure, of culture and commodity, of state and economy, of 
ideology and the material environment. It renders commensurate 
not only the distinctions between production and consumption, 
monopoly and competition, use-value and exchange-value but 
also class distinctions, leaving in their wake personifications, 
representations, appearances or images of its own movement. 
Such a mode of social organization, which, as Debord writes in 
a 1966 letter, ‘monopolizes all human communication’, entails 
also the organization of human perception, defining what is 
45. Helmut Reichelt, ‘Social Reality as Appearance: Some Notes on Marx’s Conception 
of Reality’, in Werner Bonefeld and Kosmas Psychopedis, eds, Human Dignity: Social 
Autonomy and the Critique of Capitalism, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, p. 34.
46. Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Reflections on Class Theory’, in Can One Live after Auschwitz? 
A Philosophical Reader, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 96.
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to be seen with how it is apprehended.47 The spectacle is the 
phenomenological terrain of value, a ‘monopoly of appearance’ 
(§12) which, as Debord writes, ‘naturally finds vision to be the 
privileged human sense which the sense of touch was for other 
epochs’ (§18).48 The spectacle thereby ‘says nothing more than 
‘that which appears is good, that which is good appears’ (§12).
Conclusion
The key to grasping the relations between Marx’s critique of 
political economy and Debord’s theory of the spectacle is in the 
study of the structure of the forms of appearance of value. As 
such, already in the first three chapters of Capital, Volume 1, we 
find the elementary forms of the spectacle. However, for Marx, 
the form of appearance ‘makes the actual relation invisible, 
and, indeed, shows the direct opposite of that relation’.49 This 
is in stark contrast to the way in which the spectacle oper-
ates by exposure. This is why the fetish-character of money 
is so important: the mystification acquires an objective and 
autonomous form, unlike the commodity-fetish for which social 
relations remain concealed behind the social relations of things. 
Even if having its basis within them, it remains the case that 
47. Guy Debord Correspondance, Volume 3: Janvier 1965–Décembre 1968.
48. Debord’s emphasis on vision should be situated in relation to the following passage 
in Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts, in which the history of human sensibility is made actual in 
and through the objectivity of alienated human practice: ‘Only through the objectively 
unfolded richness of man’s essential being is the richness of subjective human sensibility 
(a musical ear, an eye for beauty of form – in short, senses capable of human gratiﬁcation, 
senses affirming themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into 
being. For not only the ﬁve senses but also the so-called mental senses, the practical 
senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sense, the human nature of the senses, comes 
to be by virtue of its object, by virtue of humanised nature. The forming of the ﬁve senses 
is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The sense caught up 
in crude practical need has only a restricted sense.… For the starving man, it is not the 
human form of food that exists, but only its abstract existence as food. It could just as 
well be there in its crudest form, and it would be impossible to say wherein this feeding 
activity differs from that of animals. The care-burdened, poverty-stricken man has no 
sense for the ﬁnest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not 
the beauty and the speciﬁc character of the mineral: he has no mineralogical sense.’ 
Marx, ‘The Power of Money’, pp. 301–2.
49. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 540.
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the category of spectacle exceeds the specific determinations 
of value, a broader model of social organization for which the 
structure of appearing outpaces that which appears; or, more 
specifically, it gives particular appearances inner coherence as 
moments of a totality. 
The spectacle is a category which elevates Marx’s forms of 
appearance as a polyscopic and omnipresent element of social 
reality. As Henri Lefebvre put it, ‘there is more to Capital than 
political economy.’50 In this way, the category of the spectacle 
attempts to provide a theoretical reconstruction of social reality 
as an organic whole which is constituted in and through the 
autonomy of the forms of appearance of value. The spectacle 
ought, then, not to be measured by an attained quantitative 
degree of capitalist accumulation, but by the degree to which the 
total result of a society based on capital accumulation obtains 
objectivity at the level of ruling appearance-forms as the domi-
nant social structure. 
The spectacle is an aspect of capital that is not reducible to 
the phenomenon of exploitation. It elicits a form of impoverish-
ment that has expanded proletarian wretchedness more capa-
ciously into a nouveau prolétariat,51 one beyond classical relations 
of exploitation and deteriorating working conditions, instead 
grasping the poverty inherent within capitalist affluence. It is in 
this way that the emergence of the critique of spectacle acquires 
poignant historical determinacy through the peculiarities of 
postwar prosperity. Here, revolutionary class struggle would find 
orientation no longer simply in the emancipation from want, but 
from the dissatisfaction implicit within the dominant images of 
satisfaction and social meaning. The nouvelle pauvreté52 exceeds 
50. Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, vol. 1 (1947), trans. John Moore, London: 
Verso, 1991, p. 80.
51. Internationale Situationniste, Internationale situationniste: Édition augmentée, Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1997, p. 253.
52. Ibid., p. 256.
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material poverty and instead proliferates within the amelioration 
granted by postwar prosperity. As Debord proclaims in his 1961 
film Critique de la séparation, ‘The point is not to recognize that 
some people live more or less poorly than others, but that we all 
live in ways that are out of our control.’53 
As a critical concept, the spectacle elucidates and gives 
unifying structure to diverse phenomena within contemporary 
capitalism under a logic, derived from the structure of exchange, 
for which ‘appearances of a socially organized appearance’ (§10) 
have acquired ‘enormous positivity’ (§12). It is in the spectacular 
realm of appearance that the inner content of objectivity is 
manifest. That is, the spectacle is the total commodity of society 
– the total result of social objectification and its visible vindica-
tion. In this way, the spectacle is more suitably construed as the 
phenomenological terrain of value as a totality, or perhaps simply 
as the phenomenality of value: the self-movement of appearance-
forms which, to echo the dynamic of Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
draws into itself both subject and substance.
53. Debord, Complete Cinematic Works, p. 31.
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